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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the attitudes and knowledge of Surface 
Warfare Officers (SWOs) regarding human factors issues that have been identified as 
causal to mishaps in high-risk organizations. Attitudes to the human factors that are 
critical for safety were assessed using a 36-item survey (116 responses) based upon the 
naval aviation version of the cockpit management attitudes questionnaire (CMAQ). No 
effects were found in the attitudes of respondents based upon experience, type of ship on 
which they had last served, or whether they had attended the Navy’s Bridge Resource 
Management training (BRM; human factors training designed to improve safety and 
performance). Human factors knowledge was evaluated using a 10-item multiple choice 
test.  No effects were found in the knowledge of the 116 respondents based upon the type 
of ship on which they had last served, or whether they had attended BRM training. 
However, a significant effect of experience was found. On the basis of these findings, 
recommendations are made on how the effectiveness of the Navy’s BRM program could 
be improved. 
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Between 80% and 90% of all work-related accidents and incidents can be 
attributed to human error (Health and Safety Executive, 2002; Hollnagel, 1993; Reason, 
1990). Similarly, in the maritime industry, more than 75% of accidents can be attributed 
to human error (International Maritime Organization, 1994). Studies have shown that 
major maritime accidents are not just caused by a single direct action (or failure to act), 
but often consist of many contributing factors that may not be geographically close to the 
accident or incident (Barnett, 2005). Organizations whose performance may be 
catastrophically impacted by failures in complex human technology systems are known 
as High Risk Organizations (HROs, Shrivastava, 1986). A number of HROs have 
addressed human error by introducing specialized training designed to address human 
error, called Crew Resource Management (CRM) training (e.g., offshore oil production, 
commercial shipping; Flin, Mearns, & O’Connor, 2002). Lauber (1984) defined CRM as 
“using all the available resources-information, equipment, and people-to achieve safe and 
efficient flight operations” (p. 20). The maritime equivalent of CRM is termed Bridge 
Resource Management (BRM) or Bridge Team Management (BTM), and has been used 
by the International Safety Management (ISM) code (although it is not required by law; 
Hetherington et al., 2006). 
The purpose of this thesis was to evaluate the attitudes and knowledge of Surface 
Warfare Officers (SWOs) regarding human factors issues that have been identified as 
causal to mishaps in high-risk organizations. Attitudes to the human factors that are 
critical for safety were assessed using a 36-item survey (116 responses) based upon the 
naval aviation version of the cockpit management attitudes questionnaire (CMAQ). No 
effects were found in the attitudes of respondents based upon experience, type of ship on 
which they had last served, or whether they had attended the Navy’s BRM training. 
Human factors knowledge was evaluated using a 10-item multiple choice test (116 




industry for the last decade. However, a significant effect of experience was found. On 
the basis of these findings, recommendations are made on how the Navy’s BRM program 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
On July 3, 1988, in the Strait of Hormuz, a civilian Iranian airliner appeared on 
USS Vincennes’ radar as “Unknown/Assumed Enemy.” After repeated warnings with no 
response, the USS Vincennes illegally crossed into Iranian waters and launched two SM-2 
missiles at the airliner, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard. The investigation 
found that human error was one of the main causes of the mishap. Identified causes 
included poor decision making by senior leadership, and flawed expectancies by the 
entire combat information center (CIC) watch team. Lack of training and system 
deficiencies also played a significant role in the problems that lead up to such a horrific 
incident (Dotterway, 1992). This mishap exemplifies the harm of human error and why 
U.S. Navy senior leadership must start understanding the human dimension of operations. 
Human errors can be viewed two different ways: (1) active errors, whose effects are felt 
almost immediately; and (2) latent errors, whose adverse consequences may lie dormant 
within the organizational structure for a long time, and only become evident when they 
combine with other factors (Reason, 1990). 
A. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM FOR THE SURFACE WARFARE 
COMMUNITY 
The majority of maritime accidents that occur while operating at sea are usually 
the result of numerous unforeseen actions taken by operators. Accidents are defined as 
“any unforeseen and unplanned event or circumstances” (Merriam-Webster, 2003). For 
the purpose of this thesis, “mishap” will be used to represent all unexpected situations 
resulting in the failure to complete the operational mission. Between 80% and 90% of all 
work-related accidents and incidents can be attributed to human error (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2002; Hollnagel, 1993; Reason, 1990). Similarly, in the maritime industry, 
more than 75% of accidents can be attributed to human error (International Maritime 
Organization, 1994). A recent review of American, British, Canadian, Australian, and 
Norwegian maritime mishaps found that human error was a major factor in 80% to 85% 
of them (Barnett, 2005). Studies have shown that major maritime accidents are not just 
caused by a single direct action (or failure to act), but often consist of many contributing 
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factors that may not be geographically close to the accident or incident (Barnett, 2005). 
Other industries have addressed human error by introducing specialized training designed 
to address human error, called Crew Resource Management (CRM) training (e.g., 
offshore oil production, commercial shipping; Flin, O'Connor, & Mearns, 2002). Lauber 
(1984) defined CRM as “using all the available resources–information, equipment, and 
people—to achieve safe and efficient flight operations” (p. 20). However, for CRM 
training to be effective, the content of the training should be based on scientific data, 
rather than a “gut feel.” 
The focus of this thesis is to increase understanding of the active errors made by 
bridge team operators, and more specifically, Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) who 
holds the position of Officer of the Deck (OOD). SWOs are Navy officers whose training 
and primary duties focus on the operation of Navy ships at sea and the management of 
various shipboard systems. The bridge is the ship’s main navigational center and the 
bridge team consists of between two and six officers and five to ten enlisted personnel. 
Hence, any attempt to reduce accidents at sea should concentrate on eliminating errors on 
and within the bridge team, since that is where the problems are greatest, and where the 
biggest improvements are needed (Grech, Horberry, & Koester, 2008). Every special 
evolution (e.g., underway replenishment at sea, training, and air operations) that takes 
place has to be known to the bridge team before it can proceed. Figure 1 is an illustration 




Figure 1.    Standard Bridge Team Structure 
 
• Officer of the Deck (OOD): the Watch Officer Guide (15th ed.), describes 
the OOD as a person with a unique position in leadership. The OOD’s 
responsibilities and levels of authority are outlined in the standard 
organization and regulations of the U.S. Navy. The OOD position is held 
by junior SWOs. Factors such as the special mission of a ship, command 
policy, and guidance for a particular situation may add to these duties and 
responsibilities, but not reduce them. OODs must clearly understand that 
regardless of who carries out the duties, they are responsible for them 
being completed correctly. The OOD is accountable to the Commanding 
Officer (CO) for everything that happens during his or her watch. The 
only exceptions are those laid down by law or regulation. 
• Navigator: The Navigator is responsible for assisting the OOD in safe 
navigation of the ship at all times. 
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• Junior Officer of the Deck (JOOD): The JOOD is responsible to the 
OOD for ensuring that watchstanders are standing a correct watch. 
• Conning Officer: The Conning Officer is usually a junior officer. His or 
her responsibility is to give the steering orders to the Master Helmsman. 
• Quartermaster: The Quartermaster is an enlisted sailor responsible for 
plotting navigational fixes. He/she is considered the Navigator’s assistant. 
• Radar Operator: The Radar Operator is an enlisted sailor who is 
responsible for the surface radar picture on the bridge. 
• Master Helmsman: The Master Helmsman is a junior enlisted sailor who 
is responsible for controlling the rudder. 
• Lee Helmsman: The Lee Helmsman is a junior enlisted sailor who is 
responsible for the controlling the speed of the ship. 
• Lookouts: The Lookouts are usually junior enlisted personnel who are 
responsible for keeping watch while on the bridge. Lookouts are normally 
positioned on the bridge wings of the ship. A bridge wing is an external 
extension of the bridge located on both sides of a bridge. Bridge teams use 
bridge wings for navigation, special evolutions, and identifying other ships 
within proximity. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate the attitudes and knowledge of SWOs 
regarding human factors issues that have been identified as causally related to mishaps in 
high–risk organizations. 
C. HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION (HSI) 
HSI is an interdisciplinary approach that makes the underlying trade-offs among 
its domains explicit. It is a technical and managerial concept, bringing together various 
disciplines, with the goal of appropriately incorporating humans into the design, 
production, and operation of programs and systems (Booher, 2003). Personnel 
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performance and system performance are vital to the success of any naval underway 
operations. The three domains of HSI that will be addressed in this thesis are: 
• Training – The research will help identify the human factors knowledge 
and skills that should be addressed in training bridge personnel. 
• Personnel – The research has implications for the selection of SWOs. 
• Systems safety – The research will assist in identifying the human factors 
issues that should be addressed to improve safety in the surface fleet. 
D. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
As described above, the focus of this thesis is on the OOD position and 
understanding human error in the surface warfare community. Chapter II provides an 
overview of relevant human factors literature, and describes a human factors training 
technique called Bridge Resource Management. Chapter III describes a study of the 
attitudes of SWOs towards the human factors that have been identified as causal to 
mishaps in high-reliability organizations. Chapter IV describes a study of SWOs’ 
knowledge of human factors. In Chapter V, the implications of the findings from the 
thesis for the surface warfare community will be discussed. 
 6
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. A UNITED STATES NAVAL VESSEL AS A HIGH-RELIABILITY 
ORGANIZATION (HRO) 
Organizations whose performance may be catastrophically impacted by failures in 
complex human technology systems are known as High Risk Organization (Shrivastava, 
1986). Those organizations that succeed in avoiding catastrophes in high-risk 
environments are known as HROs (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989). HROs are found in many 
different domains, from petrochemical industries and nuclear power generation, to the 
military. They are formed from the need for effective performance in high-risk 
environments. The common factor underlying these diverse HROs is that, while a failure 
of reliability has the potential for death, loss, damage to assets, or ecological disaster, 
these organizations have developed unique properties that enable them to quickly and 
effectively adapt to unexpected events before they lead to catastrophic failures. This is 
accomplished by placing increased importance on understanding and leveraging the role 
of the human operator (O'Connor & Cohn, in press). Roberts and Rousseau (1989) 
identified eight primary characteristics of HROs. A number of researchers have identified 
Navy vessels as HROs. Table 1 summarizes each of these characteristics and provides 
examples of how they relate to a naval vessel. To illustrate, a study conducted by 
Rochlin, La Porte, and Roberts (2005) identified a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier as an HRO. 











Table 1.   Characteristics of a High Reliability Organization (HRO) with Surface Warfare 
Examples (After Roberts & Rousseau, 1989) 
Characteristic Description Surface Warfare Examples
1. Hypercomplexity. It is necessary for personnel to 
interact with a number of different 
components, systems and levels. 
Each operational unit has its own 
procedures, training, and command 
hierarchy.
There are multiple teams during any special 
evolution on a naval vessel including Underway 
Replenishment, Entering and Exiting Port, and 
anchoring (bridge team, combat team, and 
engineering team).
2. Tight coupling. There is reciprocal interdependence 
across many different units and 
levels. There are many time 
dependent processes, invariant 
process, goals, which can only be 
met in one way, and little slack in the 
system.
Each team is dependent on the other for 
effective performance (e.g. bridge team depends 
on engineering team to provide effective 
transportation while at sea). 
3. Extreme hierarchy 
differentiation.
The structure of the personnel in the 
organizations is very hierarchical.
A naval vessel has a very clear chain of 
command..




Along with extreme hierarchical 
differentiation, there are numerous 
interdependent individuals making 
decisions simultaneously, while 
employing highly redundant 
communication systems.
Officer assigned to each team during special 
evolution are each responsible for making 
decisions that affect their own, and other teams 
of the ship (e.g. UNREP and anchoring).
5. Degree of 
accountability that does 
not exist in most 
organizations.
Substandard performance or 
deviations from standard procedures 
have severe adverse consequences.
Safety of the ship rest heavily on the senior 
personnel. If any mishaps occur (e.g. collision, 
running aground, or personnel), the CO, XO 
and OOD are held accountable and often face 
severe consequences.
6. High frequency of 
immediate feedback about 
decisions.
Quick decision making and feedback 
are characteristics of operational 
decisions.
During unexpected events, decisions are made
quickly by the OOD before reporting it to the
chain of command.
7. Compressed time 
factors.
Cycles of major activities are 
measured in seconds.
Time is always a factor when conducting special
evolutions (e.g. Entering or Exiting Port in high
traffic, UNREPs, and training exercises)
8. More than one critical 
outcome that must happen 
simultaneously.
Simultaneity signifies both the 
complexity of operations as well as 
the inability to withdraw or modify 
operational decisions.
During any training exercise with another vessel,
certain operation decisions have to execute at
the same time in order to be effective.
 
This study focused on the three separate organizations that make up an aircraft 
carrier: air traffic control, utility management, and flight operations. Rochlin et al. (2005) 
argued that each of these organizations independently represent an HRO. The researchers 
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of this thesis concluded that flight operations at sea were close to an “edge of the 
envelope” operation, suggesting it represented the most extreme conditions, in the least 
stable environment. Flight operations at sea also maintained the greatest tension between 
preserving safety and reliability, while attaining maximum operational efficiency. The 
aircraft carrier’s performance strongly challenged the researcher’s theoretical 
understanding of the U.S. Navy as an organization, including its training, operational 
processes, and the problem of high-reliability organizations (Rochlin et al., 2005). 
However, despite the fact that Navy ships have fewer accidents than would be expected 
given their complexity, mishaps still occur. More often, human factors are the major 
causal factors. This will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
B. EXAMPLES OF HUMAN ERRORS  
Human error is the leading cause of mishaps in the maritime industry. Human 
error costs the maritime industry $541 million every year, according to the United 
Kingdom Protection and Indemnity Club (UK P&I Club) article posted in the 
International Maritime Human Element Bulletin (2003). The article analyzed 6,091 major 
accident claims spanning a 15-year period and found that human error cost the Club’s 
members $2.6 billion (U.S.). Figure 2 illustrates the percentage of causal factors that 

































C. EXAMPLES OF HUMAN ERRORS  
Two maritime accidents investigated by Perrow (1984) attempt to provide 
particular examples of how human error has affected the maritime industry. The first 
accident was a collision between the M/V SANTA CRUZ II and the USCGC 
CUYAHOGA while operating in the Chesapeake Bay on October 20, 1978. Although 
both vessels acknowledged each other visually and on radar, the CUYAHOGA turned in 
front of the SANTA CRUZ II, causing the collision and killing 11 personnel. Two of the 
primary human errors made during this collision were misperception by the Captain and a 
lack of communication by the crew. The Captain misinterpreted the lighting 
configuration, resulting in his misperception of the heading on the SANTA CRUZ II. 
Compounding the problem was that, although the crew was aware of the situation, they 
failed to inform or question the Captain’s decision making. The second accident 
described by Perrow (1984) took place on March 18, 1967, onboard the TORREY 
CANYON. The supertanker struck Pollard’s Rock and ran aground while transiting 
through the Scilly Islands in the English Channel, resulting in the spillage of over 
100,000 tons of crude oil. There were at least two main human errors that caused this 
vessel to run aground: pressures to keep to a sailing schedule and the stress and poor 
decision making of the Master, resulting in his decision to go through the Scilly Islands 
instead of around, as originally planned. 
Both of these examples illustrate that accidents rarely result from a single error. 
This idea is captured by the most widely known model of accident causation of human 
error—the “Swiss Cheese” model (Reason, 1997). This model is designed to provide an 
understanding of how mishaps occur and to recognize that active errors generally take 
place at the “sharp” end of the system, with “latent” failures occurring further back in the 
system. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus is on active errors and how they affect 
the operator’s ability to make smart decisions during an unexpected situation. 
Hetherington, Flin, and Mearns (2006) conducted a literature review of 20 studies 
examining human factors research in the maritime industry. Those identified human 
factors that relate to active errors included fatigue, stress, communication, situational 
awareness, decision making, and teamwork. Similarly, Rothblum (2000), a researcher for 
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the U.S. Coast Guard, also identified the role played by human factors in maritime 
accidents. In his study, the most important issues identified were fatigue, inadequate 
communication, coordination between pilot and bridge crew, and inadequate technical 
knowledge. The human factors that are relevant to active failures made by SWOs are 
described in more detail below. 
1. Fatigue 
Fatigue is cited by Rothblum (2000) as the “number one” concern and is 
frequently mentioned as a serious issue among mariners. Fatigue contributes to 16% of 
vessel casualties and 33% of the injuries. For example, in the grounding of the Exxon 
Valdez, the watchstanders reported having only six or fewer hours of sleep before 
assuming the watch (National Transportation Safety Board, 1990). Smith (2001) 
conducted research on ships in the offshore industry based on data collected over a ten- 
year span that was given to the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) by the Marine 
Accident Investigation Bureau (MAIB). The results showed evidence that fatigue was 
causal to accidents. Similarly, another study concerning ships in the offshore oil industry 
was conducted by Smith, Lane, and Bloor (2001). They concluded that most accidents 
happened during the beginning of the tour (usually within the first week), the first four 
hours of a major shift (between the hours of 0900 and 1600), and in calm environmental 
conditions. Personnel serving extended hours on watch also have been linked to causing 
more mishaps than those personnel who received a break in between their work time 
(Raby & McCallum, 1997). Despite permission being granted by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) to have a rest between working hours, there are still 
occasions where maritime personnel are working more than 12 hours with only a 6-hour 
maximum break (Hetherington et al., 2006). 
2. Stress 
Stress has been identified as a contributing factor to the productivity and health 
costs of an organization, as well as to personnel health and welfare (Cooper, Dewe, & 
O’Driscoll, 2001). A maritime example of the effects of stress is when the Master of the 
TORREY CANYON felt pressured to keep on schedule (see above). Although a small 
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amount of stress can boost performance, exposure to any extended amount of elevated 
stress can lead to negative mental and physical health outcomes (Quick, Quick, & 
Nelson, 1997). With crew sizes being reduced onboard modern merchant and U.S. Navy 
vessels, more responsibility is being given to individuals, which can cause more stress, 
both mentally and physically. Stress can lead to alcoholism, excessive smoking, 
behavioral changes, or decreased effectiveness or productivity at work (Stress Prevention 
Activities, 2002). 
3. Communication 
Communication is one of the core skills essential to effective performance in all 
high-risk industries is. Communication is crucial to building team situational awareness 
(SA), as well as teamwork and effective decision making (Hetherington et al., 2006). The 
Canadian Transportation and Safety Board (CTSB) (1995) reviewed 273 mishaps from 
1987-1992 with vessels in Canadian pilotage waters. The results showed that 42% of the 
incidents involved a misunderstanding between the Pilot and the Master or the officer of 
watch. Today, lack of communication with the Pilot is one of the main problems in the 
civilian maritime industry. Pilots are experienced mariners who are responsible for 
offering dependable knowledge and navigational information to vessels. Their main job is 
to provide the highest level of Shiphandling skills in order to maneuver vessels to and 
from ports. Based on the NTSB report (1981), 70% of major marine collisions occurred 
while a state or federal pilot was directing one or both vessels (Rothblum, 2000). 
Another communication factor in the civilian maritime industry is the language 
barriers that exist on the high seas. A study at the Seafarers International Research Centre 
(SIRC) illustrated that only about one-third of ships have a single—nationality crew 
(Kahveci & Sampson, 2001). According to the study, this can lead to miscommunication 
during a potentially hazardous situation. 
4. Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness can be described as “the ability of an individual to possess a 
mental model of what is going on at any one time, and also to make projection as to how 
the situation will develop” (Hetherington et al., 2006, p. 405). A large number of 
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maritime accidents are partly due to loss of situation awareness (Grech et al., 2008). A 
situation awareness taxonomy developed by Endsley (1995) illustrates the three steps or 
stages of situation awareness formation: perception, comprehension, and projection. 
• Perception (Level 1): The first step in achieving situation awareness is to 
perceive the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the 
environment. This involves the process of monitoring, cue detection, and 
simple recognition. This process leads to an awareness of multiple 
situational elements (objects, events, and people) and their current states 
(locations, conditions, and actions). 
• Comprehension (Level 2): The second step in situation awareness 
requires integrating all of the information from level one to understand 
how it will impact the individual’s goals and objectives. This includes 
developing a comprehensive picture of the world, or of that portion of the 
world of concern to the individual. 
• Projection (Level 3): The third and highest level of situation awareness 
involves the ability to project the future actions of the elements in the 
environment. This is achieved through knowledge of the status and 
dynamics of the elements and comprehension of the situation. This 
information is then projected forward in time to determine how it will 
affect future states of the operational environment. 
Using Endsley’s taxonomy as a tool, Grench, Horberry, and Smith (2002) 
examined 177 maritime mishaps occurring from 1987–2000, from eight countries, and 
found that 71% of all human-error types on ships were situation awareness related 
problems. The results concluded that most commonly occurring situation awareness 
errors were at Level 1. Similar results have been found in the domains of aviation and 
offshore oil drilling (Flin, O’Connor, & Chrichton, 2008). Both studies support the notion 
that the loss of situation awareness plays a significant role in incidents attributed to 
human error (Security, 2008). 
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5. Decision Making 
Effective decision-making skills are crucial to the maritime industry. Decision 
making can be defined as “the process of reaching a judgment or choosing an option, 
sometimes called a course of action, to meet the needs of a given situation” (Flin et al., 
2008, p. 12). Decision making is made up of two stages: assessing the situation (what is 
the problem?), and making a decision (what shall I do?). Studies have shown that a 
higher level of collision threats have been associated with an increase in self-rated mental 
workload (Hockey, Healey, Crawshaw, Wastell, & Sauer, 2003). The Hockey et al. 
(2003) study found that as one’s mental workload increased, the collision threat 
increased, and there was a detriment in performance and the decision-making process on 
the secondary task. This finding could lead to serious consequences in a real-life 
situation. 
6. Teamwork 
Effective teamwork is one of the key components of successful organizational 
performance (Flin, 1997). The CTSB (1995) study found that the majority of teams’ 
onboard maritime vessels felt that teamwork was “often” or “always as important as 
technical proficiency” (Hetherington, et al., 2006, p.407). Additionally, Hetherington et 
al. also cited the lack of proper crew interaction as a factor in a number of maritime 
accidents. 
A key area in the military that contributes positively or negatively to teamwork is 
a strict hierarchical command structure (Rothblum, 2000). Giving a team a free, 
interactive range of communication, as well as more control over the decision-making 
process, can enhance the team’s overall performance (Rothblum, 2000). 
D. CASE STUDY: THE RAMMING OF THE SPANISH BULK CARRIER 
URDULIZ BY THE USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER  
The U.S. Navy is not immune to human error. An investigative report published 
by the National Transportation Safety Board (1990) details the events that led to an 
accident between the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 
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(CVN 69) and the Spanish bulk carrier URDULIZ. Below is a summary of the accident, 
with the identified human factor errors that contributed to the accident. 
• On August 29, 1988 at 0747, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier  
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (CVN 69) was inbound in the Thimble 
Shoal Channel and passed through the southern opening of the 
Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel. The EISENHOWER was proceeding at a 
speed of about 11 knots (55 rpms). On the bridge, there were at least 20 
crewmembers including the CO, the navigator, the OOD, the JOOD, an 
officer liaison with the tactical operations plot radar navigation team, 
several other officers, a chief quartermaster-supervisor of visual 
navigation, a navigation plotter, a visual bearing recorder and sound-
powered telephone talker, a deck log keeper, two helmsmen, a lee 
 
helmsman or engine order operator, two visual bearing takers, and several 
sound-powered telephone talkers connected to various stations throughout 
the vessel. 
o At the onset of this situation, the sheer number of 
crewmembers and the presence of the CO on the bridge 
heightened the amount of stress for this particular evolution. 
The increased number of people also contributed to the lack of 
SA by reducing the teams’ ability to come to a consensus of the 
evolving situation. 
• Around 0800, the officers on the bridge of the EISENHOWER observed 
the URDULIZ anchored in anchorage “A.” The Spanish ship’s anchor 
chains were leading forward under a moderate strain, with the bow 
pointing into the wind, toward the Entrance Reach Channel. The back-up 
radar navigation team took fixes at 3-minute intervals and advised the 
bridge that the vessel was “on track.” However, the visual navigation team 
reported “no fix.” The navigator recommended that the OOD reduce speed 
to 3 knots (15 rpms) because the EISENHOWER was four minutes ahead 
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of its scheduled time of 0845. The navigator recalled he made the 
recommendation only to the OOD. The OOD ordered the speed change to 
the Conning Officer. The Navigator made the comment “it was 
professional to be at a position when you say you are” (NTSB, 1990, p.8). 
o From this section of the accident report, communication and 
decision making are two identifiable active errors. Despite a 
disagreement between the visual and radar teams, the OOD 
continued to make recommendations based on discrepant 
information. Lack of communication, in turn, contributed to 
poor decision making by the OOD by ordering the Conning 
Officer to change speeds without acquiring a consensus from 
all of the available resources, including an accurate fix from 
the radar navigation team, Conning Officer, and a full 
understanding from the CO. 
• The visual navigation team had not been able to collect a fix for over 15 
minutes. The team’s supervisor, Quartermaster Chief, was unable to 
explain why a fix had not been taken during this time period. He 
postulated that an equipment failure might have been the cause of the 
navigation team’s inability to get a good fix. Ultimately, the Quartermaster 
Chief (QMC), who was the senior enlisted person on the bridge, relieved 
the plotter and erased part of the plot. 
o Inability onboard the EISENHOWER to obtain a fix for over 
15 minutes increased the level of stress among crewmembers. 
Also, the inability to obtain a fix for such an extended period of 
time decreased the crews’ SA, as they were unable to have a 
clear understanding of their exact location and therefore be 
unable to predict their course. Both the increased level of stress 
and lack of SA contributed to poor decision making by the 
QMC, who relieved the plotter and erased portions of the plot. 
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This decision further limited the amount of information 
available to the team. 
• At 0817, the OOD ordered a rudder and speed change. He also advised the 
CO that he had reduced to 3 knots (15 rpms). The CO stated that he had 
not been aware that the navigator or OOD had change the speed to 3 
knots. The CO further stated he did not hear the call to the lee helmsman 
indicating 3 knots (15 rpms). The CO ordered the speed back to 5 knots 
(25 rpms). The Navy docking pilot, who was in the tugboat headed toward 
the EISENHOWER, was about one mile away and believed that the 
EISENHOWER was going to collide with the anchored URDULIZ. 
o The OOD previously informed the navigator of a speed change 
without also informing the CO, showing a breakdown in the 
line of communication. Failure to provide the CO with 
dependable navigational information added to the lack of SA. 
Outside of the EISENHOWER, the Navy docking pilot 
exercised poor decision making by failing to provide the 
EISENHOWER with the observations of a possible impending 
collision. 
• One of the officers on the watch from the URDULIZ admitting observing 
the EISENHOWER approach, but did not take any action or sound a 
danger signal, because he believed that the vessel would come close, but 
would not collide. 
o Similar to the Pilot on the Navy tugboat, officers on watch 
from the URDULIZ exercised poor decision making by failing 
to take precautionary measures, such as sounding a danger 
signal or communicating with the EISENHOWER. Part of the 
poor decision making made by the officers on watch aboard the 
URDULIZ resulted from a lack of SA. Officers on watch were 
unable to foresee an accurate picture of the course of action of 
the EISENHOWER. 
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The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable causes of 
this accident were the delayed and insufficient action to correct the EISENHOWER’s 
deviation from the intended track by the navigator and the OOD because of inexperience 
in piloting the vessel through the restricted channel in Hampton Roads. Analysis of this 
report shows how active errors at each stage of action contributed to the overall outcome 
of this incident. This case study also shows how active errors have a cumulative 
contributory affect (versus independent effect) on mishaps. 
E. NAVAL SAFETY CENTER DATA  
The USS EISENHOWER mishap described above provides an example of how a 
number of human errors lead to a mishap. However, this mishap was just a single 
incident. To obtain more information on the contribution of human error to surface 
warfare mishaps, the Naval Safety Center was contacted. Two sources of information 
were obtained: (1) a human factors analysis of surface mishaps from 1992–1996; and (2) 
data on the human factors causes of mishaps from 1999–2009 that is stored in the surface 
warfare mishap database. Each of these data sources will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
1. Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFAC) Analysis 
of Surface Mishap Class “A” Data 1992–1996 
The Naval Safety Center used the HFACS to analyze all surface Class “A” 
mishaps (1 million dollars damage or a fatality) from 1992–1998. The Naval Safety 
Center was unable to provide a total number of events or actual causal factors. Drawing 
on Reason’s (1990) theory of latent and active failures, HFACS categorizes human error 
at each of four levels: (1) the unsafe acts of operators; (2) preconditions for unsafe acts: 
(3) unsafe supervision (i.e., middle management); and (4) organizational influences 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). HFACS has a clear hierarchical structure, and has been 




The details of how the analysis was accomplished were not provided in the 
presentation. The most frequently identified failure was at the “act” level, with 91% of 
mishaps having a failure at this level. The second most common failure was found to be 
at the supervisory level (84% of mishaps), followed by unsafe crew conditions (known as 
preconditions for unsafe acts in the current version of HFACS, occurring in 56% of 
mishaps), and organizational level failures (38% of mishaps).  
A more detailed classification of the mishaps is provided in Figure 3. The first 
level of unsafe acts was separated into two subcategories: (1) errors—these are simply 
mistakes or unintentional acts; and (2) violations—these are intentional, deliberate 
behaviors that break established rules. The second level of unsafe supervision was also 
divided into two subcategories: (1) inadequate supervision—these are similar to errors, 
but are unintentional mistakes or failures by supervisors; and (2) supervisory violations—
these are deliberate rule breaking or disregard of authority by supervisors. The third level 
of unsafe crew conditions was divided into (1) medical—this includes everything from 
lack of sleep to personal stresses that make an operator unable to function in his/her 
duties; and (2) crew resource management—this includes poor crew coordination or 
ineffective communication. The final level of organizational influences was divided into 
(1) external—these factors are controlled by sources outside the CO’s control (e.g., 
budgetary allotments); and (2) internal—these are those factors that are controlled by the 





















Figure 3.   Surface Class “A” Mishaps Level I too Level II Analysis using the HFACS Tool, 
Fiscal Year 92–98 (From Afloat Directorate NSC presentation, no date) 
The graph above shows that, over the 7-year period of evaluation, unsafe acts 
accounted for 91% of Class A mishaps. Unsafe supervision accounted for 84%, unsafe 
crew conditions accounted for 56%, and organizational influences accounted for 38%. Of 
the two leading areas of error, unsafe acts and unsafe supervision, errors and inadequate 
supervision comprised the bulk of casual factors leading to mishaps. These finding are 
consistent with the literature presented here, showing that active human errors are 
responsible or casual factors in the majority of mishaps. 
2. Surface Mishap Class “A” Data 1992–2009 without HFACS Analysis 
The second set of data was obtained from the Naval Safety Center database of 
Class A surface ship mishap data from FY99–09. HFACS was not used to determine 
causal factors. The data consisted of the causal factors used by the Naval Safety Center to 
describe 74 Class A surface mishaps. A total of 232 causal factors were identified. Each 
event number in the report is associated with a FY and causal factor, and the results are 
summarized in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   P Pie Chart of Surface Class “A” Mishaps Analysis without HFACS Tool,  
Fiscal Year 99–09 
Undetermined refers to mishaps for which the causes have not yet been 
determined, are under investigation, or for which there was insufficient information to 
identify a causal factor. It should be noted that 111 mishaps that occurred more than five 
years ago were still under some form of investigation. Material factors refer to those 
causes that were attributed to normal wear and tear and equipment failure. In Figure 4 
and Figure 5, the 23% of mishaps being attributed to human factors is much lower than 
the figure obtained from the HFACS study of surface warfare mishaps, and lower than 




Figure 5.   Surface Class “A” Mishaps Analysis without HFACS Tool, Fiscal Year 99–09 
From a discussion with the Naval Safety Center, it would appear that the HFACS 
study was a “one off” of historical investigation carried out by a Navy Aerospace 
Experimental Psychologist with considerable experience in investigating the human 
factor causes of mishaps. The failure to capture the human factor causes of mishaps has 
been reported in other U.S. Navy communities. O’Connor, O’Dea, and Melton (2007) 
examined 263 U.S. Navy diving mishap reports collected by the Naval Safety Center 
from 1993–2002. A total of 70% of the mishaps were attributed to “unknown” causes, 
with only 23% attributed to human factors. O’Connor et al. (2007) offer a number of 
reasons for the high proportion of “unknown” causes. There may be a lack of 
understanding about what “human factors” actually denotes. No formal training is 
provided to individuals completing the investigation on human factors. There may also be 
reluctance for those involved in the mishap to provide an accurate account of what 
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happened for fear of punishment. Nevertheless, despite the lack of evidence on human 
factors collected by the Safety Center, it would seem that there is a need to address 
human error in the Surface Navy. The next section will describe a type of training that is 
designed to address human error, and how it is being applied in both the maritime 
industry and the Navy. 
3. Addressing Human Error with Bridge Resource Management 
Given the high percentage of accidents attributed to human error in high-risk 
industries, these industries have developed a number of techniques to reduce human 
error. One of the most widely used techniques is called Crew Resource Management 
(CRM) training. CRM can be defined as “using all the available resources—information, 
equipment, and people—to achieve safe and efficient flight operations” (Lauber, 1984, p. 
20). 
CRM was first used in the aviation industry, but is now being used in a wide 
range of high-reliability industries including the nuclear and offshore industries, the 
medical profession, and the naval aviation community (Barnett, Pekcan, & Gatfield, 
2004; Edkins, 2002; Helmreich and Merritt, 1998). The first use of CRM training in the 
military was by aviation. Based on civil aviation models, the early military aviation CRM 
courses were not well received. However, in the early 1990s, the U.S. Army, Navy, and 
Air Force began funding CRM-related research, making great advances toward 
developing a research-based model for delivering effective military CRM training (Prince 
& Salas, 1993). 
As with other HROs, CRM is also being used in the civilian maritime industry. 
The maritime equivalent of CRM is termed Bridge Resource Management (BRM) or 
Bridge Team Management (BTM), and has been used in the maritime industry for the last 
decade. While BRM or BTM courses are recommended by the International Safety 
Management (ISM) code, they are not required by law (Hetherington et al., 2006). It is 
important to recognize that, beyond research that was originally conducted in the 
development of aviation CRM courses, a review of the literature reveals no empirical 
foundation for the training that is being used in the maritime industry. 
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BRM was initially designed to improve the relationship between the Master and 
the Pilot, but soon transformed into the BRM course being taught worldwide today 
(Barnett, Pekcan, & Gatfield, 2005). Although BRM is taught differently than CRM, it 
still contains instruction on the same key elements (e.g., teamwork, leadership, and 
communications). To illustrate, Marine Safety International (2007) teaches a BRM course 
over a 3-day period. The course includes both classroom and simulator time. This 
combination of course instruction and simulator sessions allows the bridge team to 
practice the skills taught in the classroom. Table 2 provides an example of the Marine 
Safety International (MSI) BRM course. 
 
Table 2.   MSI BRM Schedule (36 hrs.) (After MSI Training &Courses, 2007) 








 Situational Awareness Communication Process 
 Error Chain Analysis Leadership, Teamwork & 
Decision Making 
Simulation and Debrief 
 Lunch Lunch Lunch 
A
fternoon 
 Simulator Orientation Stress & Stress Management Case Study 
 Case Studies Simulation and Debrief Course Review & Critique 
 
BRM is also being used in the U.S. Navy to train SWOs. The current BRM 
training being utilized by the Navy is based on a civilian maritime model, rather than 
research specifically carried out with the Surface Navy. It has been used at the Surface 
Warfare Officers School Command Course (SWOSCOLCOM) in Newport, RI for the 
last three years. Today, over half of the COs onboard U.S. Navy vessels are sending their 
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junior officers to BRM located at the MSI (Maritime Safety Institute History, 2007). MSI 
has been providing ship-handling training for the Navy since 1974. The three-day Navy 
BRM course aims to increase teamwork and SA of bridge personnel. Although it is not a 
requirement, it has become one of the most well-attended training courses for the surface 
warfare community (Reynoso, 2007). In Newport, Rhode Island, a mandatory BRM 
program exists for junior officers as a completion requirement within the 
SWOSCOLCOM. Unlike the civilian BRM training, the course’s total training length is 
24 hours, with 14 hours of lecture and 10 hours of simulation. The objectives and hours 
required for each topic are planned and compacted into a dense time schedule. This type 
of schedule is characteristic of a highly reliable organization in that it leaves little room 
for adjustments. Table 3 outlines the topics, objectives, and time allocation in the Navy’s 
BRM program. 
Table 3.   BRM Course Target Objective (After SWOSCOLCOMIST 5216.2S, 2009) 
Topic Objective # of Hours 
Introduction Provide student with an overview of BRM. 2 
Shiphandling Provide the student the theory and application ship control. 2 
Communication Demonstrate on open communication style conducive to a 
comfortable bridge environment. 
1 
Error Chain Identify error chains and show how to stop them from causing a 
mishap. 
4 
Pilot Student will know how to execute effective Pilot/CO/OOD 
relationships. 
1 
Leadership Student will know the Elements and Principles of Leadership. 2 
Voyage Planning Student will understand proper voyage planning. 2 + 2 in 
simulator 
Simulator Sessions Channel transit with moderate environment and traffic. 1–4 
Simulator Sessions Channel transit with moderate environment and heavy traffic. 2–4 
Simulator Sessions Execute plan from voyage planning. 2–4 
 
To the knowledge of the author, the effectiveness of the Navy’s BRM course has 
not been evaluated. The Federal Aviation Authority (2004) states that for CRM training: 
It is vital that each training program be assessed to determine if CRM 
training is achieving its goals. Each organization should have a systematic 
assessment process. Assessment should track the effects of the training 
program so that critical topics for recurrent training may be identified and 
continuous improvements may be made in all other respects. (FAA, 2004) 
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The same is true of BRM training. An evaluation is arguably even more important 
when a training program is first implemented to identify where improvements can be 
made before the training becomes too integrated into the culture. One of the issues with 
many of the early aviation CRM training courses was that it was not possible to obtain a 
measure of effectiveness because a baseline measure of effectiveness had not been 
obtained prior to implementation. 
F. SUMMARY OF HUMAN ERROR AND CRM IN SURFACE 
OPERATIONS  
Human error in the civilian maritime industry and naval vessels is the most 
commonly cited cause of mishaps. In an attempt to address this issue, both the maritime 
industries and, more recently, the Navy, have adopted BRM training. However, the 
training is based on a civilian airline model, rather than research focused on addressing 
the issues in the surface warfare community. Therefore, there is a need to conduct a 
baseline measurement of effectiveness of the Navy’s BRM program. In the next chapters, 
two studies will be described in which a baseline measure of the BRM attitudes and 




III. SURFACE WARFARE COMMUNITY ATTITUDINAL 
ASSESSMENTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe an evaluation of the attitudes of SWOs 
to concepts that have been identified as causal to mishaps in HROs. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the mishap data from the Safety Center was of limited utility in 
identifying the human factors areas that should be addressed.  The survey will provide a 
baseline measurement of attitudes to human factors in the SWO community, and identify 
areas that may require increased focus.  Helmreich (1987) ascertains that it is only 
through the modification of attitudes that we can substantially change observable 
behavior. Research in the aviation industry has shown that attitudes about the 
management of flight-deck resources are relevant to understanding error (Helmreich & 
Merritt, 1998) and to the quality of crew coordination (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & 
Russini, 1986). 
A. BACKGROUND 
An “attitude” is a generic term including beliefs, opinions, values, and preferences 
(Schuman & Presser, 1996). Oppenheim (1992) defined it as a “state of readiness, a 
tendency to respond in a certain manner when confronted with certain stimuli” (p. 174), 
that is reinforced by beliefs, feelings, and which can lead to specific behaviors or action 
tendencies. An attitude statement, then, is “a single sentence that expresses a point of 
view, a belief, a preference, a judgment, an emotional feeling, a position for or against 
something” (p. 174). The most commonly used survey for assessing attitudes to CRM 
concepts is the Cockpit Management Attitudes Questionnaire (CMAQ; Gregorich & 
Wilhelm, 1993). 
B. COCKPIT MANAGEMENT ATTITUDES QUESTIONNAIRE (CMAQ) 
The CMAQ was designed as a research tool with the purpose of evaluating the 
effectiveness of CRM training in civilian aviation (Gregorich, Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 
1996). The original civilian aviation version of the CMAQ consisted of three factors: (1) 
personal vulnerability to external and internal stressors; (2) attitude toward interpersonal 
 28
communications and team coordination; and (3) leadership and authority (Gregorich, 
Helmreich, & Wilhelm, 1990). The CMAQ has formed the basis of a CRM attitude 
questionnaire in a number of industries (e.g. nuclear power generation, aviation 
maintenance, air traffic control, medicine, offshore oil production, divers; Flin et al., 
2008). The advantage of basing a questionnaire on the CMAQ is that it has been proven 
to have reasonable psychometric characteristics (O’Connor & Jones, 2009). The 
questionnaire used in the current study has five subscales: my stress, stress of others, 
communication, command responsibility, and rules and order. The change from the 
original CMAQ factor structure was based upon a confirmatory factor analysis carried 
out with a version of the CMAQ developed for naval aviation sample (see O'Connor, 
Jones, Buttrey, & McCauley, under review). The five subscales are: 
• My stress: consisting of 6 items (items 1, 3, 4, 8, 9, and 15; see Appendix 
B). This subscale emphasizes the awareness and compensation for, stress 
in oneself (e.g., “even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical 
operations”). 
• Stress of others: consisting of 6 items (items 2, 13, 17, 19, 21, 25). This 
subscale emphasizes the consideration compensation for stressors in other 
team members (e.g., “members of my watch team should monitor each 
other for signs of stress or fatigue”). 
• Communication: consisting of 6 items (items 5, 10, 11, 20, 23, 31). This 
subscale encompasses communication of intent and plans, delegation of 
tasks and assignment of responsibilities, and the monitoring of 
crewmembers (e.g., “the specific and responsibilities of the watch team in 
an emergency are identified during the pre-brief”). 
• Command responsibility: consisting of 12 items (items 6, 14, 16, 18, 26, 
27, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36). Command responsibility includes the 




tasks and responsibilities (e.g., “the Commanding Officer should take 
physical control and drive the ship in emergency and non-standard 
situations”). 
• Rules and order: consisting of 4 items (items 7, 22, 24, 28)). This 
subscale is concerned with adherence to rules and procedures (e.g., “a true 
professional does not make mistakes”). 
C. HYPOTHESES 
Three hypotheses were tested. It was intended to also examine the effects of rank. 
However, as will be seen in the results section, no responses were obtained from senior 
officers.  
1.  Hypothesis One 
 HO:  There is no difference in attitudes of SWOs to the concepts  addressed in  
  BRM based upon type of ship. 
 HA: There is a difference in attitudes of SWOs to the concepts addressed in  
  BRM based upon type of ship. 
Previous studies found that there were differences between the CRM attitudes of 
naval aviators based upon the type of aircraft flown (O'Connor & Jones, 2009). It is 
postulated that officers from different types of ships will have different attitudes to BRM 
concepts. 
2.  Hypothesis Two 
 HO:     There is no difference in attitudes of SWOs to the concepts addressed in  
  BRM based on experience. 
 HA: There is a difference in the attitudes of SWOs to the concepts addressed in 
  BRM based upon experience. 
Issues of rank and experience play a significant role in military flight crews 
(Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). This idea was supported in a survey of 272 U.S. Navy divers 
using an attitudes questionnaire based upon the CMAQ. It was found that inexperienced 
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divers were significantly more sensitive to the effect of personal limitations on 
performance, and showed a significantly greater willingness to want to speak up than 
more experienced divers (O’Connor, 2007). Further, O’Connor and Jones (2009) also 
found differences in the attitudes of naval aviators towards CRM concepts based upon 
rank/experience. Therefore, it is suggested that similar results will be found with SWOs. 
3.  Hypothesis Three 
 HO:  BRM-trained SWOs have the same attitude towards the concepts   
  addressed in BRM training as the non-BRM trained SWOs. 
 HA: BRM-trained SWOs have a more positive attitude toward the   
 concepts addressed in BRM training than non-BRM trained SWOs. 
A number of studies have used the CMAQ (or a derivative of it) to compare 
attitudes before and after CRM training. O’Connor et al (2007) carried out a meta-
analysis of nine studies that compared the attitudes of CRM personnel from a number of 
domains (military aviation, civilian aviation, medical personnel, and offshore oil 
workers) to a control group who had not received any CRM training. O’Connor et al. 
reported a large effect size of CRM training. Therefore, similar findings are expected in 
with the surface warfare community. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
1. Instrument and Development  
A 36-item questionnaire was developed based upon the naval aviation version of 
the CMAQ developed by Jones (2009). The aviation questionnaire was specifically 
adapted for the SWOs using terms and concepts that were readily understood in the 
community.  For each item, the degree to which participants agree was assessed with a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree; see Appendix 




A pilot questionnaire was distributed to a group of 10 experienced SWOs for their 
review and feedback. The comments were collected and used to develop the surface 
warfare human factors (SWHF) questionnaire. Table 4 identifies which item was 
associated with each of the five proposed subscales.  
Table 4.   Attitudinal Composite Subscales and Scale Items 
Subscales Scale Items
My stress 1,3,4,8,9,12,15
Stress of others 2,13,17,19,21,25
Communication 5,10,11,20,23,31
Command responsibility 6,14,16,18,26,27,29,30,32,33,34,35,36
Rules and order 7,22,24,28  
2. Procedure  
The study was approved by the Naval Postgraduate School Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) before being distributed to participants. A pencil and paper version of the 
test was distributed to participants at Surface Warfare Officer Command School 
(SWOSCOLCOM) in Newport, Rhode Island. A web-based version linked to electronic 
mail was distributed to participants at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey, 
California. Participation in the study was strictly voluntary and a consent form was 
provided informing respondents of their rights and risks associated with volunteering. No 
compensation was provided to those who participated. 
3. Participants  
A total of 116 SWOs completed the attitude questionnaire. A total of 68 (58%) 
responses were obtained from NPS and 48 (42%) were from SWOS. A total of 58 (50%) 
had fewer than three years experience as a SWOs and 58 (50%) had more than three 
years experience as a SWOs. No senior officers (05 and above) participated in the survey. 
A total of 97 (84%) respondents attended BRM. Based on previous duty assignment, each 




• 42 (36%) from Destroyers (14% 0–3 years, 22% >3 years) 
• 44 (38%) from Carriers / Amphibs (21% 0–3 years, 17% >3 years) 
• 30 (26%) from Frigates / Cruisers ( 16% 0–3 years, 10% >3 years) 
 
E. ANALYSIS 
1. Psychometric Properties 
An analysis of the psychometric properties of the attitude questionnaire was 
performed. The skewness and kurtosis of the individual items were examined. Skewness 
is a measure of the extent to which the data looks different on either side of the center 
point. Kurtosis measures whether the data is peaked or flat relative to a normal 
distribution (NIST/SEMATECH, 2006). The skewness and kurtosis of each item is 
reported in Appendix D. It can be seen that many of the items have what would be 
considered to be fairly high levels of skewness and/or kurtosis. However, despite this, it 
was decided to enter all of the items into the scale reliability analysis. 
An internal reliability assessment was carried out for each subscale using 
Cronbach’s alpha.  Cronbach’s alpha is a statistic that is commonly used as a measure of 
internal reliability. The alpha coefficient ranges in value from 0 to 1. Generally 0.7 is 
considered to be indicative of an acceptable level of reliability (Journal of Extension, 
1994); however, lower levels of reliability for this type of questionnaire are often quoted 
in the literature (O’Connor et al, under review). Lower alpha values do not necessarily 
make the finding invalid. Sometimes low alphas can be indicative of the diversity of the 
subscale. 
The Cronbach’s Alpha values for each of the subscales are shown in Table 5. For 
the ‘my stress’ subscale, this alpha value was achieved after removing item 12 (this 
increased the alpha value from 0.48 to 0.53). It can be seen that reasonable levels of 
reliability were found for all of the subscales except for “rule and order”; therefore, as a 




Table 5.   Cronbach’s Alpha Value Corresponding to Each Subscale 
Subscales Alpha
My stress 0.48
Stress of others 0.6
Communication 0.45
Command responsibility 0.72
Rules and order 0.06  
2. Between Group Comparison Data  
The mean scores on each of the questionnaire subscales were calculated. Two-
way, between-subjects, Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) on group comparison data were 
carried out independently for each subscale to evaluate hypotheses one and two. The two 
independent variables were experience (0–3 years, and more than 3 years), and type of 
ship (destroyer, frigate/cruiser, or carrier/amphib). To evaluate the third hypothesis, the 
Mann-Whitney U test was used. It was decided to use this non-parametric test to compare 
the mean factor scores of BRM and non-BRM participants due to the large differences in 
the sample sizes.  The statistical analysis of each of the subscales is reported below. 
My stress. Figure 5 shows the mean factor scores for the six items that comprise 
the ‘my stress’ factor. The two way ANOVA did not show significant main effects of 
ship (F(2,110)= .001, n.s.)  or experience (F(1,110)= .26, n.s.),The interaction effect between 
the two variable was also not found to be significant (F(2,110)= .07, n.s.). There was not a 




Figure 6.    Mean factor score and standard deviations for the “My stress” subscale 
Stress of others. Figure 7 shows the mean factor scores for the six items that 
comprise the ‘stress of others’ factor. The main effects of ship (F(2,110)= .05, n.s.), and 
experience (F(1,110)= .00, n.s.) were not significant. The interaction between the variables 
was also not significant (F(2,110)= .30, n.s.). The comparison between the scores for the 
BRM and not BRM trained personnel was not significant (U=1389.0, n.s.).  
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Figure 7.   Mean factor score and standard deviations for the “Stress of others” subscale 
Communication. Figure 8 shows the mean factor scores for the six items that 
comprise the ‘communication’ factor. There were not significant main effects of ship 
(F(2,111)= 1.05, n.s.) or experience (F(1,111)= .12, n.s.). The interaction effect between the 
two variable was not significant effect of experience was significant (F(2,111)= 1.56, n.s.). 
The Mann Whitney U test did not reveal a significant difference for the BRM and non-






Figure 8.   Mean factor score and standard deviations for the “Communication” subscale 
Command Responsibility. Figure 9 shows the mean factor scores for the thirteen 
items that comprise the ‘command’ factor. There were not significant main effects of ship 
(F(2,110)= .31, n.s.) or experience (F(1,110)= .05 n.s.). The interaction effect between the two 
variable was not significant (F(2,105)= .14, n.s.). The comparison between the scores for 




Figure 9.   Mean factor score and standard deviations for the “Command responsibility”  
subscale  
F. DISCUSSION  
1. Psychometric Properties  
That items were dropped from the questionnaire is a normal part of questionnaire 
developed (DeVellis, 1991). Moreover, reliability issues with the rule and order factor 
were also reported by Jones (2009) with naval aviators and O’Connor et al (2007) with 
U.S. Navy divers. Therefore, this factor may not be suited to military populations. It is 
recommended that a confirmatory factor analysis should be carried out of the attitude 
questionnaire to assess whether the proposed factor structure provides an acceptable fit to 




2. Between Group Comparison Data 
Hypothesis One  
The null hypothesis, that there is no difference in attitudes of SWOs toward the 
concepts addressed in BRM based upon type of ship, was supported. A significant 
difference on the basis of last ship was not found for any of the subscales. The lack of 
significant difference on the subscales between SWOs based on type of ship is not 
surprising. As a group, SWOs have careers that are more homogeneous than those of 
aviators. Aviators spend a career flying one particular type of aircraft, whereas SWOs 
will move between different types of ships and different roles as they progress through 
their career. To illustrate, junior officers in the Surface Community immediately report to 
their first ship as a division officer after commissioning.  On completion of their first 
tour, they choose a new ship to serve a second division officer tour. Normally, the next 
ship would be of a different class and mission from their first. Unlike aviators, SWOs do 
not develop an affinity with a particular type of ship. Therefore, distinct attitudes to 
human factors based upon a particular class of ship do not develop. This finding is 
beneficial to the SWO community in that it may not be necessary to develop distinct 
BRM programs for each ship. Rather, a generic BRM program (as is currently the case) 
would seem to be an effective method for training across classes of ships.  
Hypothesis Two 
The null hypothesis, that there is no difference in attitudes of SWOs toward the 
concepts addressed in BRM based on experience, was supported. No significant 
difference on the basis of experience was found on any of the subscales. This finding 
differs from that of Jones (2009) who found that senior aviators were more supportive 
than junior aviators of an open cockpit climate as reflected by a significantly higher mean 
item score for the “command responsibility” and “communication” subscales. Similarly, 
O’Connor (2007) reported that inexperienced U.S. Navy divers (those with fewer than 
five years of experience) had a significantly greater awareness of how factors such as 
stress and fatigue affect performance, and the need for open communication than more 
experienced divers.  
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A possible explanation for the lack of an effect of experience in the SWO 
community is that there was a restricted range in experience of the respondents. The 
mean years of experience of the SWO sample was 3.6 years (st dev= 2.5). In both the 
naval aviation and diving samples, the range of experience was much greater. For 
example, Jones (2009) had a total of 230 (63%) responses from senior officers (O-4 to O-
5).  Therefore, before conclusions can be drawn about the effect of rank or experience, 
there is a need to collect data from more experienced SWOs. Arguably, feedback from 
senior officers on their attitudes to human factors is more important than the feedback 
from junior officers. The Captain of a Navy ship is responsible for setting the tone of the 
command. His, or her, word is final. Therefore, the attitude of the Captain towards human 
factors issues is crucial to the behavior of the ship’s company.  
Hypothesis Three 
The null hypothesis, that BRM-trained SWOs have the same attitude towards the 
concepts addressed in BRM training as the non-BRM trained SWOs, was supported. This 
finding was surprising considering that significant effects were found in previous studies 
comparing CRM-trained individuals with a control group that had not received CRM 
training. A possible reason for the lack of a difference in the SWO sample is that content 
being taught in the Navy’s BRM courses does not address all of the factors in the attitude 
questionnaire. The SWOSCOLCOM BRM course addresses only communication and 
leadership. Further, where the factors are addressed, little time is devoted to them. 
Another issue is the relatively small proportion of respondents that had not been exposed 
to BRM training. It would have been desirable to have a much larger control group that 
had not had recent exposure to BRM training. This group could then have been included 
as a variable in the ANOVA along with the experience and “last ship” variables. 
3. Comparison with CRM/BRM Attitudes of Naval Aviation 
Although a statistical comparison was not carried out, the mean factor scores for 
SWOs was lower on every subscale than the mean score for naval aviation population 
(see Jones, 2009 for a detailed discussion of the naval aviation sample). This finding is 
not surprising. CRM training has been used in the aviation community for more than two 
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decades, and is based upon research specifically identifying the human factors skills that 
should be trained (see O’Connor, Hahn, & Salas, in press for more information).  In 
contrast, in the surface warfare community, BRM training has only been used in a 
systematic fashion for the last three years. Moreover, the training is based upon a 
commercial shipping model, rather than the specific human factors issues of the surface 
warfare community. 
G. ATTITUDINAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 
All of three null hypotheses were supported. Differences in attitudes were not 
found in any of the subscales based upon experience, type of ship, or whether the 
respondents had attended BRM training. In Chapter IV, the same three hypotheses will be 








IV. SURFACE WARFARE COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE 
ASSESSMENTS 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the human factors BRM knowledge of 
SWOs.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Although knowledge is something that is routinely tested in academic settings, 
surprisingly few studies have reported a knowledge assessment of CRM/BRM concepts. 
O’Connor et al. (2007) found only six studies of CRM knowledge. For example, in 
military aviation, Salas, Fowlkes, Stout, Milanovich, & Prince (1999) found that, 
although CRM training did not show an effect on the pilots’ attitudes, it did appear to 
increase their knowledge of teamwork principles. Those who had participated in the 
CRM training scored significantly better than the baseline group that had not received 
any training (a mean of 12.6 out of 17, compared to 9.8, respectively). Stout, Salas, and 
Kraiger (1996) also attempted to assess knowledge gain with military personnel but 
found no significant change on a multi-choice knowledge test between the trained and 
control groups. However, this could be attributed to the very small number of participants 
(12 trained and 10 controls).  
Using a multi-choice questionnaire is a quick and simple way of receiving 
feedback on knowledge acquisition. It can be administered to a large number of 
individuals and with little effort. Establishing the baseline knowledge of SWOs is 
important to identify what should be included as part of BRM training. 
It should be indicated that the knowledge test used in this study was not based 
upon the Navy’s BRM curriculum. Instead, it was based upon the naval aviation CRM 
training curriculum. The purpose for this was to provide a comparison sample for naval 
aviation (a detailed description of this comparison can be found in O’Connor, under 
review). Nevertheless, although not directly related to the Navy’s BRM course, the 
concepts addressed in the questionnaire are important for safety and effectiveness in both 
aviation and surface warfare domains. 
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B.  HYPOTHESES  
1.  Hypothesis One 
HO: There is no difference in performance on the knowledge test among SWOs  
  based on the type of ship. 
HA: There is a difference in performance on the  knowledge test among SWOs  
  based on the type of ship. 
There is no reason to expect that experience on one particular type of ship will 
result in higher performance on the knowledge test than experienced gained on another 
type of ship. Further, Jones (2009) found no variation in the performance of aviators on 
the knowledge test based upon type of aircraft.  
2.  Hypothesis Two 
HO:  There is no difference in knowledge test performance between more and 
less experienced SWOs. 
 HA: More-experienced SWOs score higher on the knowledge test than less- 
  experienced SWOs. 
As a result of spending time in the surface warfare community, some personnel 
will have gained knowledge through experience. The questions are mainly scenario-
based. Therefore, it is possible that through exposure to different situations onboard, a 
ship that some of the concepts may have been learned. Further, Jones (2009) found 
differences in knowledge test performance of naval aviators based upon rank/experience.  
3. Hypothesis Three 
 HO:  There is no difference in scores on the knowledge test based on SWO’s  
  exposure to BRM training. 
 HA: BRM-trained SWOs score higher on the knowledge  test than SWOs who  
  have not been exposed to BRM-training. 
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As discussed earlier, the knowledge test was not specifically based upon the 
Navy’s BRM program. Nevertheless, it is expected that exposure to BRM training will 
have an effect on performance on the knowledge test. In a meta-analysis of four studies 
of CRM knowledge carried out by O’Connor et al (2007), a medium effect of CRM 
training was found for knowledge evaluation when performance was compared between 
individuals who had been exposed to training and a control group who had not been 
exposed to the training. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Instrument and Development 
As mentioned, above the knowledge test was based upon concepts addressed in 
the naval aviation CRM program.  The knowledge test consisted of 10 items specifically 
concerning knowledge and skills pertaining to human error, workload management, 
assertiveness, situational awareness, decision making, communication, mission analysis, 
fatigue, and stress effects on performance (see Appendix B).  
2. Procedure 
The test was screened and approved by the Naval Postgraduate Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) before being distributed to participants. A pencil and paper version 
of the test was distributed to SWOs at SWOS. A web-based version linked to electronic 
mail was distributed to SWOs at NPS.  
3. Participant  
A total of 116 SWOs completed the attitude questionnaire. A total of 68 (58%) 
responses were obtained from NPS and 48 (42%) were from SWOS. A total of 58 (50%) 
had less than three years experience as a SWO and 58 (50%) had more than three years 
experience as a SWO. No senior officers (O5 and above) participated in the survey. A 
total of 97 (84%) respondents attended BRM. Based on previous duty assignment, each 
SWO was classified into one of three categories:  
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• 42 (36%) from Destroyers (14% 0–3 years, 22% >3 years) 
• 44 (38%) from Carriers / Amphibs (21% 0–3 years, 17% >3 years) 
• 30 (26%) from Frigates / Cruisers ( 16% 0–3 years, 10% >3 years) 
 
D. RESULTS 
The overall mean percentage correct was 54.4% (st dev=12.0%). This can be 
compared with naval aviators’ mean percentage of 62.5% correct (st dev= 13.6%). Table 
6 summarizes the performance of the SWOs on each individual item, and compares the 
percentage of correct responses to that of naval aviator sample collected by Jones (2009). 
The mean percentage of the total number of items answered correct is summarized in 
Figure 10.  
Table 6.   Percentage of Correct Responses to Knowledge Questionnaire Items 
  SWO  Aviation  
Questions Knowledge Categories % correct % correct 
1  SA 72.9 54.1 
2 SA 38.2 46.5 
3 Communication 70.3 66.6 
4 Decision Making 74.8 76.3 
5 Communication 63.7 63.8 
6 Decision Making 10.2 40.7 
7 Communication 66.9 87.0 
8 Decision Making 18.6 9.3 
9 Fatigue 72.9 90.1 
10  Stress 55.5 86.1 








Figure 10.   Mean and standard deviation of KANCRM score of SWOs 
Between Data Comparison 
A two-way, between-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed on 
the total number of items that were correctly answered. The two independent variables 
were experience (0–3 years, >3 years), and type of ship (destroyer, frigate/cruiser, and 
Carrier/amphib). There was a significant main effect of experience (F(1,105) = 7.3, p<0.5). 
This showed more experienced officers performed significantly better than inexperienced 
officers on the questionnaire. There were no significant main effect of ship (F(2,105) = 
0.03, n.s.). The interaction effect between the two variable was also not significant 
(F(2,105) = 0.4, n.s.).  
The Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare the overall score on the 
knowledge test between BRM and non-BRM trained participants. As would be expected 




The null hypothesis, that there is no difference in performance on the knowledge 
test among SWOs based on the type of ship, was supported. As expected, there was not a 
significant difference in performance on the knowledge test based upon experience 
gained in different classes of ship. All Navy ships have a similar command structure, and 
standard operating procedures. Moreover, the method of qualifying as a SWO is also 
similar from platform to platform. Therefore, there was no difference in human factors 
knowledge based upon type of ship as expected. 
Hypothesis Two 
The null hypothesis, that there is no difference in knowledge test performance 
between more and less experienced SWOs, was not supported. More experienced SWOs 
scored significantly higher on the knowledge test. Although the argument could be made 
that a mean difference of 6.7% is not of operational significance, there was a consistent 
difference in the overall performance on the knowledge test based upon experience. 
Therefore, perhaps due to the use of scenario-based questions, the experienced SWOs 
knew the correct answer more often as they had been exposed to the relevant situations 
onboard ship. 
Hypothesis Three 
The null hypothesis, that there is no difference in scores on the knowledge test 
based on SWOs’ exposure to BRM training, was supported. This finding was surprising 
considering that significant effects of training on knowledge were found in previous 
studies of CRM. The issues identified in the previous chapter on lack of an effect of 
BRM training on attitudes are also relevant here. The lack of an effect can also be 
attributed to the fact the knowledge test was based upon the broader range of topics 
covered in the Navy’s CRM training course as compared to the BRM training. 
Nevertheless, it suggested that the concepts addressed in the knowledge test are important 
for safe and effective performance. 
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F. COMPARISON WITH NAVAL AVIATORS 
Overall, naval aviators were more knowledgeable than SWOs, although that could 
be argued that the difference was not as large as would have been expected given the test 
was based on the material addressed in naval aviation CRM training. 
Out of the ten questions, there were three questions for which the difference 
between naval aviators and SWOs was particularly large. A total of 40% of aviators 
responded correctly that inexperienced individuals tend to misjudge the time available 
and react too quickly, compared to 10% of SWOs who answered correctly; a total of 86% 
of aviators responded correctly that performance is optimized when an individual is 
experiencing a moderate amount of stress compared to 55% of SWOs; and a total of 87% 
of aviators responded correctly that giving information too quickly during a pre-brief is 
ineffective communication, compared to 66% of SWOs who answered this question 
correctly. 
It is suggested that some of the differences between aviators and SWOs can be 
attributed to differences in the command structure between the two communities. 
Inexperienced SWOs usually depend on their superiors for making decisions during a 
non-standard situation. This is not the case in the aviation community. Aviators operate 
in much smaller teams, and are likely to have to respond more quickly than SWOs. 
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the ability to communicate and make 
rational decisions are both essential in reducing human error. The Navy’s BRM course 
does not fully address these areas. 
G. KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY 
The only significant difference in knowledge was between experienced and 
inexperienced SWOs. There was no difference based upon type of ship, nor whether the 
participants had attended BRM training. Also, although naval aviators performed better 
than SWOs on the test, the difference was not as large as would have been expected. In 
the next and final chapter, recommendations will be made to improve the Navy’s BRM 
course on the basis of the findings from the attitude and knowledge assessments.  
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter applies the findings from the studies described in this thesis to make 
recommendations for both improving the human factors analysis of surface mishaps, and 
increasing the effectiveness of the Navy’s BRM program. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFETY CENTER 
Mishap reports from the Naval Safety Center were examined to determine how 
human factors were identified in a mishap. Two sources of information were obtained: 
(1) a human factors analysis of surface mishaps from 1992-1996; and (2) information on 
the human factors causes of mishaps from 1999-2009 that is stored in the surface warfare 
mishap database. In contrast, the findings from the data suggested a strong need to 
address human error in the Surface Navy utilizing measuring tool such as HFACS.  
The first source of information was a one-off analysis of surface mishaps. The 
second source of data analyzed for this thesis would appear to grossly underestimate the 
extent to which human factors contribute to surface mishaps. In 2005, all members of the 
U. S. DoD signed a memorandum of agreement to use DoD-HFACS to investigate the 
human factors causes of aviation, ground, weapons, afloat, space, and off-duty mishaps 
(Joint Services Chiefs, 2005). Therefore, it is expected that DoD-HFACS will soon be 
used by surface mishap investigators at the Naval Safety Center. DoD HFACS is not 
without issues (see O’Connor, 2008 for a discussion). Nevertheless, if users have proper 
training on how to use the system, it should serve as an effective method for collecting 
data. It is suggested that the last decade of class “A” surface mishaps should be recoded 
using DoD-HFACS, and this information should be used to guide the content of the 
Navy’s BRM training. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BRM COURSE  
In high-reliability industries, a training need analysis is an essential pre-requisite 
for identifying and providing information about the crucial competencies that are 
required to effectively train. Just as was the case for the naval aviation CRM program, 
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there is a need for a systematic research effort to identify the particular human factors 
issues that should be included as part of the Navy’s BRM program. In addition to 
addressing issues such as communication and leadership, it is suggested there should also 
be a focus upon other subjects like situation awareness, teamwork, decision-making, and 
stress management. 
The effects of BRM should be evaluated periodically, particularly if changes are 
made to the curriculum. It is important to track the effects of the BRM training to ensure 
that it is improving performance. Further, this evaluation data could be used for internal 
performance auditing, as well as for benchmarking across communities and to ensure an 
optimal return on training investment. 
C. CONCLUSION 
As in other HRO, human factors have a large effect on performance and safety in 
the Surface Navy. The Navy’s BRM program represents a good start to addressing the 
human factors issues facing SWOs. However, as suggested in this thesis, further research 
should be carried out to identify all of the human factors issues that are affecting SWOs, 
and there is a need to develop effective mechanisms for addressing these issues.  
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APPENDIX D. NAHF QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS 
 
Skewness Std. Error of Skewness Kurtosis Std. Error of Kurtosis
 N
 NAHF analysis Statist ic Std. Error Statist ic Std. Error Statist ic
My stress 1 Even when fatigued, I perform effectively -0.2 0.2 -0.9 -1.4 0.4 -3.4 145
Other stress 2 I let  my watch team know when my workload is excessive 0.0 0.2 0.0 -1.3 0.4 -3.3 145
My stress 3 Underway, my decision-making is effective in emergency situations -0.6 0.2 -3.2 -0.5 0.4 -1.3 145
My stress 4 I am likely to make judgment errors in an emergency -0.1 0.2 -0.3 -1.0 0.4 -2.4 145
Comms 5 Debriefing after each watch is important -0.9 0.2 -4.7 -0.2 0.4 -0.5 145
Command 6 In abnormal situations, I rely on my superiors 0.1 0.2 0.5 -1.1 0.4 -2.7 145
Rules 7 True professional can leave problems behind during underway 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -1.3 0.4 -3.2 145
My stress 8 I am less effective when I feel stressed or fatigued -0.9 0.2 -4.4 0.3 0.4 0.8 144
My stress 9 My performance is adversely affected by working with an inexperienced watch team -0.3 0.2 -1.5 -1.1 0.4 -2.7 145
Comms 10 If I perceive a problem during underway operations, I will speak up -1.0 0.2 -4.8 0.3 0.4 0.7 145
Comms 11 Pre-briefs for underway operations are  important -2.3 0.2 -11.4 5.7 0.4 14.2 144
My stress 12 I let  my superiors know when my workload is excessive. 0.3 0.2 1.5 -1.0 0.4 -2.5 143
Other stress 13 My watch team should monitor each other  stress or fatigue -1.9 0.2 -9.4 4.8 0.4 12.0 143
Command 14 JOs should not question the OOD's decisions in emergencies 0.4 0.2 1.7 -1.0 0.4 -2.5 143
My stress 15 Personal problems can adversely affect  my performance -0.7 0.2 -3.3 -0.4 0.4 -1.1 143
Command 16 Watch team should not question actions of the CO except for safety -0.4 0.2 -2.2 -0.9 0.4 -2.2 143
Other stress 17 Watch team should mention their stress before during watch -0.8 0.2 -4.1 0.0 0.4 -0.1 143
Command 18 OOD should take physical control and drive the ship in emergency cases 0.6 0.2 2.9 -1.1 0.4 -2.6 143
Other stress 19 Effective teamwork requires consideration of others from watch team -1.0 0.2 -5.0 1.9 0.4 4.8 143
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Comms 20 Communications and coordination are important as technical proficiency -2.5 0.2 -12.3 6.8 0.4 17.0 143
Other stress 21 Watch team should alert  others to their work overload -1.1 0.2 -5.6 1.1 0.4 2.7 144
Rules 22 A true professional does not make mistakes 3.9 0.2 19.0 17.5 0.4 43.4 143
Comms 23 Responsibilit ies of watch team are identified in an emergency during pre-brief -1.1 0.2 -5.3 0.4 0.4 1.0 143
Rules 24 Written procedures are necessary for all underway operations -0.8 0.2 -3.7 -0.5 0.4 -1.1 142
Other stress 25 Watch team should be aware and sensit ive to other -0.3 0.2 -1.3 -0.6 0.4 -1.4 142
Command 26 JOs should not question the OOD decisions during normal operations 0.9 0.2 4.3 0.0 0.4 0.1 142
Command 27 JOs should not question the CO’s decisions in emergencies -0.1 0.2 -0.6 -1.3 0.4 -3.1 142
Rules 28 It  is better to agree with other crew members than to voice a different opinion 1.5 0.2 7.4 2.5 0.4 6.1 142
Command 29 COs who encourage suggestions from ship’s crew are weak leaders 3.1 0.2 15.4 10.7 0.4 26.6 143
Command 30 COs should take physical control and drive the ship in emergency cases 1.0 0.2 4.8 -0.2 0.4 -0.5 142
Comms 31 O O Ds should verbalize  actions for understanding and acknowledgment -2.4 0.2 -11.7 7.5 0.4 18.7 143
Command 32 Watch team should not question actions of the OOD except for safety of the ship -0.1 0.2 -0.4 -1.2 0.4 -3.0 142
Command 33 Crew members share responsibility in high workload situations -0.8 0.2 -3.9 -0.1 0.4 -0.3 141
Command 34 Conning Officer should never assume control of the bridge -0.5 0.2 -2.6 -1.0 0.4 -2.5 141
Command 35 OOD who encourage suggestions are weak leaders 2.2 0.2 10.8 4.8 0.4 12.0 142
Command 36 JOs should not question the CO 's decisions during normal operations 0.2 0.2 1.2 -1.1 0.4 -2.8 141
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